In Brian Leighton (Garages) Restricted v Allianz Insurance coverage Plc  EWHC 1150 Civ 8 the Courtroom of Enchantment construed the wording of a air pollution exclusion and decided that it utilized narrowly and solely the place air pollution (or contamination) was the proximate explanation for the injury.
The case involved a gas leak which contaminated the insured property. Whereas the gas leak gave rise to air pollution or contamination, the events agreed it was not the proximate explanation for the injury. The proximate trigger was penetration of the gas pipe by a pointy object. The Courtroom of Enchantment overturned the primary occasion determination and held by a majority that the air pollution exclusion required air pollution or contamination to be the proximate explanation for the injury in order that the exclusion didn’t apply on the details of this case.
The insured claimant (BLG) ran a storage enterprise and was insured underneath a Motor Commerce Coverage (the Coverage) offered by Allianz Insurance coverage Plc (Allianz). This was an All Dangers coverage.
In June 2014 a gas leak occurred on BLG’s premises after a pointy object ruptured a pipe which related an underground gas tank to 6 of BLG’s forecourt gas pumps. The gas leak contaminated the insured premises such that the BLG enterprise needed to be closed for well being and security causes.
The insured introduced a declare for materials injury and enterprise interruption underneath the Coverage. Allianz denied cowl on the idea of an exclusion (the Exclusion) which offered as follows:
“Air pollution or Contamination”
Injury attributable to air pollution or contamination, however We pays for Injury to the Property Insured not in any other case excluded, attributable to:
a. air pollution or contamination which itself outcomes from a Specified Occasion
b. any Specified Occasion which itself outcomes from air pollution or contamination.”
It was widespread floor that no Specified Occasion (as outlined within the Coverage) had occurred.
On the level of enchantment, the events had been agreed that the loss was attributable to a technique of contamination or air pollution (the gas leak) as a part of the causative chain however that the proximate explanation for the loss was the sharp object which had ruptured the gas pipe, not the contamination or air pollution itself.
The insured argued that the Exclusion utilized solely the place air pollution or contamination was the proximate explanation for the injury. In distinction, the insurer contended that the Exclusion excluded cowl the place the contamination or air pollution varieties any a part of the method within the chain of causation and the write-back in clauses a. and b. conferred cowl the place a Specified Occasion performs any half within the chain of causation whether or not extra remotely or extra instantly than the air pollution or contamination.
The Courtroom of Enchantment’s determination was break up 2:1 with the bulk granting the enchantment and discovering that the Exclusion didn’t apply.
The place to begin was the overall precept in insurance coverage legislation that an insurer is barely answerable for losses proximately attributable to a peril lined by the coverage. Nonetheless, the Courtroom famous that this presumption is able to being displaced, as expressed in Monetary Conduct Authority v Arch Insurance coverage (UK) Ltd  UKSC 1:
“The requirement of “proximate” causation relies on the presumed intention of the contracting events….However it’s a presumption able to being displaced if, on its correct interpretation, the coverage gives for another connection between the loss and the prevalence of an insured peril.”
The principal query for the Courtroom of Enchantment was whether or not the Exclusion displaced this presumption.
The Courtroom famous that the language used provides rise to the presumption that the events supposed the Exclusion to use to air pollution or contamination as a proximate trigger. This was mirrored in the usage of “attributable to” which it was famous “has traditionally and uniformly been interpreted on this context as importing the idea of proximate trigger”. It was additional bolstered by the use in a distinct Part of the Coverage to “immediately or not directly attributable to” though the Courtroom did notice that warning ought to be exercised in counting on this contrasting wording when this explicit Coverage contemplated insureds choosing cowl underneath some however not all Sections of the Coverage and the that means of the Exclusion should be the identical for all insureds. Nonetheless the Courtroom stated that the contrasting wording:
“reveals that the drafter had nicely in thoughts the excellence between “attributable to” that means proximately brought about, and “immediately or not directly attributable to” connoting a looser connection between the Injury and air pollution or contamination, a distinction which is nicely established by judicial authority”.
The Courtroom then regarded to the construe the Exclusion as a complete together with the write-back of canopy in paragraphs a. and b. The Courtroom discovered that the presumption was not displaced by the wording of the write-back as a result of it was able to being given that means persistently with it. It additionally famous that the write-back wording is launched by the phrases “attributable to”. The Courtroom discovered that paragraphs a. and b. of the write-back provision offered protection the place it could in any other case be excluded by the exclusionary wording. Paragraphs a. and b. had been due to this fact engaged solely the place air pollution or contamination was the proximate trigger. The proximate trigger presumption was, due to this fact, not displaced by the write-back provision.
The Courtroom recognised that this development gave the exclusion a slender scope however stated that this was not a motive to reject it. The Coverage was to cowl all dangers of fabric injury (except excluded). The chance of gas leakage was an apparent threat for a enterprise akin to BLG (a storage) which meant a broad scope of protection was desired. Such want aligned with a slender interpretation of the exclusion.
It’s value noting the dissenting judgment from Males LJ. Whereas he agreed with a lot of the bulk reasoning, in his view the phrases used within the Exclusion, when learn of their entirety, sufficiently demonstrated an intention by the events to displace the proximate trigger presumption. Specifically, when contemplating the write-back provisions and the listing of Specified Occasions within the Coverage which included “Fireplace, lightning, explosion,…storm, flood, escape of water from any tank equipment or pipe….”
Males LJ famous what he known as a “deliberate distinction” between the truth that “escape of water from any tank equipment or pipe…” was lined as a Specified Occasion and the escape of gas which was not, regardless of it being an apparent threat for the proprietor of a petroleum storage. He additionally famous that fireside and explosion are lined that are apparent penalties which can end result from an escape of gas.
He concluded that the aim of the write-back provision was to make sure that the place there’s a Specified Occasion which causes or is attributable to air pollution or contamination, protection could be offered. This advised that the write-back provisions weren’t involved with the proximate trigger of injury and, due to this fact, the “attributable to” language within the write-back didn’t imply proximate trigger. Following the overall precept that the place events use the identical language in the identical clause it’s presumed to imply the identical factor, this advised that “attributable to” within the opening of the Exclusion was not involved with proximate trigger.
Males LJ additionally discovered that no reliance ought to be positioned on the wording utilized in different clauses inside different sections of the Coverage. The language within the Exclusion ought to be thought of independently to derive that means. It is because policyholders are entitled to pick out protection underneath some however not all sections in a coverage.
He additionally discovered that the development of the Excessive Courtroom accorded with the pure and goal that means of the Exclusion and he famous that the insured had not beforehand contended within the first occasion trial that the Exclusion was restricted to proximate trigger. This level was solely raised within the insured’s oral submissions on the enchantment which Males LJ stated was “highly effective affirmation that the decide’s development accorded with the pure that means” of the Exclusion.
This case is a crucial determination for policyholders illustrating the modern method of the Courtroom of Enchantment to causation in coverage exclusions which additionally embody write backs of canopy. Such clauses are in widespread utilization in a wide range of contexts (nicely past air pollution and contamination exclusions) and so the cautious evaluation of Popplewell LJ will probably be instructive in a variety of conditions. The case is a useful reminder of the primacy of the precept of proximate trigger but in addition the truth that and methods wherein it may be displaced. Additionally it is clear from the bulk reasoning that if events want to depart from this presumption in a coverage, clear language should be used.
Curiously the Courtroom of Enchantment was aware of the steerage from the Supreme Courtroom within the FCA Check Case that the method to development shouldn’t be that of a ‘pedantic lawyer’ however somewhat an inexpensive individual within the footwear of an SME. That stated, the Courtroom of Enchantment noticed that each assureds and their brokers have entry to authorized recommendation and since insurance policies in lots of fields comprise phrases of artwork which have acquired their that means through use and judicial interpretation it’s the responsibility of brokers to grasp and, if mandatory, advise assureds on them.
The break up determination within the Courtroom of Enchantment additionally reveals how tough it may be to find out the events’ intentions which, but once more, emphasises the necessity for clear language and thought to make sure that coverage language displays the dangers that are to be transferred from insured to insurer.